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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (13 Aug 70)

POR OT UT 702230

20 August 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d
Armored Division, ~~Reinforced Brigade~~ 20 August 1970 (U)

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D ARMORED DIVISION
APO 09039**

AETFCC-O

20 May 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division (WAEKFF) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

1. Section 1. Operations; Significant Activities. None

2. Section 2. Lesson Learned; Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Integration of Replacements Streamed into Tank Gunnery Program.

(a) Observations: The 3d Armored Division has six organic Armor Battalions consisting of 51 tanks in each battalion for a total of 56 tanks requiring normally 1224 crewmen, USAREUR mans divisional forces below 100% authorized MTCE strength. This reduction varies from a high of 93% to a low of 85%. This strength level is reflected in the manning of tank crews. Prior to 6 December 1969, CINCUSAREUR gave priority to a unit 30 - 60 days prior to the unit undergoing annual training. This permitted the unit to man all crews and vehicles and to undergo training with all its organic equipment. On 6 December 1969, CINCUSAREUR changed this priority manning policy to preclude that what had been occurring under the former policy. That is: An annual high cyclic turnover of tank crewmen under the new policy of reduced input. 11E replacements were judiciously assigned to insure equitable distribution among the six Armor Battalions. Some enlisted men in MOS 11C or 11D were assigned to battalions for training as driver and loader. This amounted to a total of less than 20 EM. The maximum number of officer personnel, First Sergeants and other battalion personnel were assigned as tank crewmen. But, immediately thereafter, with little input and continued personnel losses, units would lose the high level training and combat readiness enjoyed during their annual training cycle. The contributing factor of this loss of combat readiness was that another unit would be receiving priority and hence little manpower would be available for all units to maintain at a high strength level. Faced with this major change of policy at the most inopportune time for the 3d Armored Division (six days after their turn had come to receive priority), general plans were altered to achieve maximum training with the anticipated reduced replacement input. These plans were:

1. Rotate drivers and loaders. Using the same person on two different tanks would save 51 EM per battalion and 306 per division.

FOR OT UT

702230

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division
(WAEKFF) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

2. Dropping one tank per platoon. This would reduce personnel requirements by four crewmen per platoon, 36 per battalion, and 216 per division.

2. Assign other basic skills to man tanks. Such as: A light weapons infantryman, artilleryman, armor recon specialists or indirect fire crewmen. This plan would contribute to some malassignments, increase safety hazards, and perhaps produce less than desired training results. A modification of the plan was utilized by the division. Battalion Commanders were instructed to make maximum effort to man as many tanks as possible. Commanders then proceeded to identify members of their battalions who had previously served as tank crewmen and reassigned them to tank crewmen positions. The first battalion to undergo training at MTA fielded 37 tanks. Later battalions were able to man 42 tanks. Overall, the division is expected to fire 240 tanks.

(b) Evaluation: As we expected, the above plan did not permit the division to fire all tanks. It did utilize personnel to the maximum and did not contribute to mass malassignments. The remaining ten maneuver battalions of the division were not drawn down to cadre status to insure that all tanks fire. This, if permitted, would reduce the combat readiness of those battalions below USAREUR manning levels and caused serious loss in combat readiness. Preliminary reports indicate that the division will achieve a higher qualification score than ever before. Moreover, unlike previous years, the battalions will be able to maintain by replacement input, a higher level of tanks manned than in previous years when there was a sharp drop after MTA due to massive rotations and little replacement input.

(c) Recommendation: That CINCUSAREUR continue the 6 December 1969 policy for at least twelve months and evaluate the effects of this policy. At this time, certain advantages are evident. These are:

1. Little, if any, malassignments of personnel.
2. Maintain a high number of tank crews after MTA because of continued replacement input.
3. Reduces cost in transporting and maintaining all tanks to and from THE MTA.

(2) Immunization Record for Personnel Newly Arriving in the Command.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division
(WAEKFT) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

(a) Observations: Approximately thirty-five personnel arrived in the 3d Armored Division from CONUS during the first quarter of FY70 without record of immunization, PHS Form 731.

(b) Evaluation: From the above observations it can be deduced that a similar situation may exist theater wide. The PHS Form 731 is a bulky, easy to mutilate, difficult to safekeep, and a readily lost document.

(c) Recommendation: Overseas processing stations insure that personnel departing CONUS have an up to date PHS Form 731. Further recommend that the record of immunization, PHS Form 731, be reduced to an easily handled, durable, wallet size document which can be conveniently carried by military personnel in travel status.

(3) Turbulence of Personnel Turnover

(a) Observations: Since 1 February 1970, the G4 Section has had eight officers and enlisted personnel arrive and has had nine officers and enlisted personnel depart.

(b) Evaluation: Rotation of personnel in this section is considered normal; however, the overlap time allowed for on the job training of replacements prior to the departure of an encumbant is not long enough. Average overlap between replacement and encumbant is five days.

(c) Recommendation: That replacement personnel be present for duty and on the job training 15 days prior to an encumbant.

b. Operations:

(1) Receipt of Major End Items of Equipment.

(a) Observations: That administrative requirements to be completed to insure smooth receipt of new equipment are not fully clarified by all agencies involved, e.g., administrative requirements between port, depot, and consignee.

(b) Evaluation: Consignee project officers designated to insure the smooth receipt of new equipment by a consignee personally visits all agencies involved in administrative requirements.

(c) Recommendation: None.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division
(WAEKFF) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

(2) Mission Statistics

(a) Observations: There was a lack of any concrete statistical data to evidence the mission accomplishments of a medical battalion.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of statistics reflecting mission accomplishments of a medical battalion had created some problems in the past. By devising a system whereby the units of the battalion report certain data, in a standard format to headquarters each week, the battalion commander and Operations Officer, as well as the company commander themselves, are able to better observe the operations of their units. It has been found that this report is also an effective management tool because it has revealed cases of mismanagement of resources by supported activities, allowing for command emphasis in areas where abuse is noted. Attached as inclosure 1 is a copy of the report.

(c) Recommendation: That a similiar report be devised at each battalion level unit. Reports should be constructed to fit the mission of each particular unit.

(3) M110 Winterization Kit

(a) Observations: The necessity of removing the M110 Winterization Kit has created a great deal of trouble in planning rail movements to MTA.

(b) Evaluation: No instructions are available for removal, storage, and reinstallation of Winterization Kits for the M110.

(c) Recommendation: A study should be made and instructions published for removal and reinstallation of M110 Winterization Kits. Any resulting procedures should be applicable to section level.

(4) Firing of Honest John Rockets

(a) Observations: 2/73 Artillery experienced a height burst error on four of six Honest John rockets fired at Grafenwoehr.

(b) Evaluation: Extensive checking and re-checking of Fire Direction and Firing Battery Procedures were made with no errors in procedure detected.

(c) Recommendation: That a study be made of Honest John Rockets fired by other units to see if the same problem exists.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division
(WAEKFF) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

(5) Operational Readiness Checks (CRCs)

(a) Observations: In an effort to conserve POL expenditures during ORCs and to exercise other components of vehicles in addition to the engines, an artillery battalion has replaced the daily ORC startup period with once-weekly four mile convoys by each battery.

(b) Evaluation: By means of the convoy technique, the battalion has been able to reduce POL consumption, since the vehicle engines are run just one time per week, and only for the duration of the convoy. Also, maintenance problems were reduced, by being able to better diagnose maintenance deficiencies, especially in the case of tracked vehicles. Finally, new drivers are receiving steady and controlled training in the operation of the larger vehicles. The program in these three respects has been a success.

(c) Recommendation: That the program of a weekly ORC be extended to other battalions.

c. Training

(1) Sub-Caliber Devices

(a) Observations: The present 30 caliber sub-caliber device for the 106mm recoilless rifle (RR) is unsuitable because of difficulty in obtaining ammunition. There is no sub-caliber device available for the 90mm RR.

(b) Evaluation: The present 30 caliber sub-caliber device for the 106mm RR should be converted to a 7.62mm sub-caliber device. The 7.62mm ammunition is easier to obtain and by utilizing frangible ammunition training can be conducted at home station on existing sub-caliber ranges as well as at MTAs. The same is true for the 90mm RR.

(c) Recommendation: That the 106mm RR 30 caliber sub-caliber device be changed to a 7.62mm sub-caliber device, and that a device be manufactured for the 90mm RR.

(2) Range Packet

(a) Observations: The range packet concept was used to supply range OICs with necessary equipment to run ranges.

(b) Evaluation: By consolidating necessary equipment such as binoculars, range flags, flashlights, stopwatches, and assorted expendables

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division
(NAKFF) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

into a 105mm ammunition box, the range OIC could account for his property and be prepared in advance for all range requirements. Range packets could be easily transported from one range to another when OICs change ranges. Sensitive items could be signed for by the individual OIC and secured in the range packet.

(c) Recommendation: That units consider the possibility of using these pre-prepared range packets while operating ranges during MTA period.

(3) Sub-Caliber Gunnery Examinations

(a) Observations: Sub-caliber gunnery examinations for the 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles have not been administered often enough.

(b) Evaluation: Range facilities to accomplish this sub-caliber firing can be superimposed on the miniature tank ranges.

(c) Recommendations: That crew-served weapons personnel be required to undergo quarterly sub-caliber firing.

(4) Pyrotechnics

(a) Observations: Pyrotechnics are in short supply and not readily available for tactical training.

(b) Evaluation: The lack of pyrotechnics hinders realistic training by reducing enthusiasm during training periods.

(c) Recommendation: That pyrotechnics be made available.

d. Intelligence

(1) Subversion and Disaffection

(a) Observations: During the reporting period there has been an increase in leftist radical attempts to alienate the local population from the U.S. military presence in West Germany. These attempts have consisted primarily of demonstrations and marches. There has also been an increase in attempts to disaffect 3d Armored Division personnel by leftist/radical groups. These attempts have consisted of underground newspapers, coffee houses, and dissident meetings.

(b) Evaluation: An increased effort is being made by leftist/radical groups to subvert USAREUR's mission.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division
(WAEKOFF) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

(c) Recommendation: That higher headquarters conduct investigations to determine who is making this effort, what their goals are, and what methods they employ. And that higher headquarters provide specific guidance to subordinate units on how to protect against or minimize this threat.

e. Logistics

(1) 5KW Generators assigned to the Medical Battalion

(a) Observations: The 5KW Generators assigned to the 45th Medical Battalion under MTOE 8-35E provide only 17.5 amps of power. To properly operate the field sterilizers assigned to the battalion, a power source of greater than 25 amps is necessary.

(b) Evaluation: Using organic generators it is impossible to operate the field sterilizers of the Medical Battalion properly.

(c) Recommendations: That the problem be studied and evaluated by the Army Medical Department Research and Development personnel.

(2) Elevation Cylinder

(a) Observations: Main gun tubes failing to maintain proper elevation on M60 and M60A1 tanks.

(b) Evaluation: Main gun tube failed to maintain proper elevation due to the elevation cylinder being inoperative. After investigation and consultation with technical representatives from 3d Armored Division, it was determined that improper seating of a metal ball in the reservoir filter caused the problem. Presently, no specific instructions exist that deal with this problem.

(c) Recommendation: That specific maintenance instructions be issued to all units describing the cause of the failure and the proper maintenance required for repair.

(3) Consolidation of all PLL

(a) Observations: That Bde FAST has no stock of repair parts for Engineer peculiar items (bucket loaders, dozers, chain saws, and some five ton dump parts). Further more, the Combat Engineer Company does not have its own weapons PLL.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division
(WALKFF) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

(b) Evaluation: In the present structure, all PLL (weapons and equipment) is consolidated at battalion level.

(c) Recommendations: It is recommended that the Combat Engineer Company maintain its own PLL or that some provision be made for the company to take a portion of the battalion PLL when the company is attached to the brigade. This would give the company the capability of sustaining itself until the brigade FAST could add engineer peculiar items to their stock of repair parts.

(4) Lubrication of 15 ton 4 Wheel Lowbed Semi-trailer M172

(a) Observations: Frequent blowouts on this type semi-trailer are often due to locking brakes.

(b) Evaluation: To prevent locking brakes on this piece of equipment, proper lubrication of the rear axle brake system is most important. Experience has shown that the brake system is not properly lubricated because operators miss the grease fitting located on the brake camshaft on the inner side of the spreader and on the brake slack adjuster. Without adequate lubrication at those points, the brake camshaft tends to stick when the trailer's brakes are applied. Another cause of locking brakes on this trailer is the dirty brake air chamber will tend to stick after the brakes are released if the cylinder is dirty. This is also affected by lack of lubrication on the brake camshaft.

(c) Recommendation: Adequate supervision when scheduled lubrications are performed on this trailer is needed to insure that the brake camshaft is properly lubricated. Periodic disassembly and cleaning of the brake air chamber is required to keep the air chamber piston operating smoothly.

(5) Wheel Spacers on M172 Dual Wheels.

(a) Observations: Spacer disks requisitioned through supply channels are not thick enough to adequately separate dual wheels.

(b) Evaluation: Inadequate spacing of dual wheels on M172 Semi-Trailer is a contributing factor to blowouts.

(c) Recommendation: That units utilize unservicable wheel rims as spacer plates between dual wheels on the M172 semi-trailer.

f. Organization: None.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report, Lesson Learned of 3d Armored Division
(WAEKFF) For Period Ending 30 April 1970.

g. Other

(1) Demonstrations at Hanau against alleged Chemical Weapons Storage Site.

(a) Observations: Throughout the quarter, there were several instances of protest meetings and demonstrations by militant organizations against an alleged chemical storage site in Hanau.

(b) Evaluation: The main agitator was a minor local politician. Most of the demonstrators were from outside of Hanau. The latest demonstration on 21 March was almost a complete failure and drew about 100 West Germans. The West German news media largely ignored the demonstration but East German television crews covered it. Many stories that did appear in the German press were slanted and inaccurate. PAO did not make any news releases. There were no incidents, but the city issued a demonstration permit allowing the demonstrators to pass dangerously close to several U.S. Installations.

(c) Recommendations: 1. That commanders insure that local officials are completely familiar with the exact locations and dimensions of U.S. installations (i.e., access roads).

2. That PAO makes a news release after anti-US demonstrations to counter inaccurate reports.

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AETVCG-F (20 May 1970) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 3d Armored Division, WAEKFF, for The Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (RI)(C) 7

DA, Headquarters, V Corps, APO 09079 18 JUN 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Department of The Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1.(c) ORLL of the 3d Armored Division has been reviewed.

2.(c) Ref par 2a(1): Concur. Present policy is effective in maintaining a higher number of qualified tank crews in each battalion throughout the training cycle and in minimizing the effects of personnel turbulence.

3.(c) Ref par 2a(2): Concur. Updating and recording of immunizations is a POR qualification requirement and should therefore be accomplished prior to an individual's departure from CONUS. CONARC should be notified through appropriate channels when replacements arrive with this deficiency. PHS form 73 is a bulky, easily mutilated document unsuited for an individual to carry on his person. Concur in recommendation to replace this health form with a more suitable one.

4.(c) Ref par 2a(3): This is a common problem brought about by the high personnel turnover rate.

5.(c) Ref par 2b(1): Concur. The assignment of a project officer at receiving unit level is an excellent means of effecting coordination between the agencies involved in the receipt of new equipment, and in fulfilling necessary administrative requirements.

6.(c) Ref par 2b(2): A reporting system designed to accurately reflect mission accomplishment is a useful management tool, but should be adopted as a standard reporting system only after a proper evaluation by reporting units.

7.(c) Ref par 2b(3): Installation of the winterization kit on the M107/M110 is a GS support responsibility. Removal and reinstallation of the kits should be accomplished or supervised by GS support maintenance personnel.

8.(c) Ref par 2b(4): The 2/73d Artillery did not submit a malfunction report IAW par 2b, UR 735-235. 3d Armored Division DAO has been informed of this requirement.

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AETVGC-F (20 May 1970) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 3d Armored Division, WAEKFF, for The
Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI)(DTA)

9.(c) Ref par 2b(5): Concur. A weekly ORC with a four mile road test is an efficient and economical means of exercising vehicles, diagnosing maintenance deficiencies, and training drivers.

10.(c) Ref par 2c(1): 3d Armored Division has been issued .30 caliber ammunition authorized by CTA 23-100-6.

11.(c) Ref par 2c(2): Concur. Range packets save time in preparation for range firing and insure necessary equipment will be available for range operation.

12.(c) Ref par 2c(3): Concur. Quarterly sub-caliber firing for 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifle crews is desireable providing training time and sufficient ammunition are available.

13.(c) Ref par 2c(4): Pyrotechnics are issued IAW CTA 23-100-6. 3d Armored Division has received all training pyrotechnics authorized. Unit has been informed of actions required to request a change to the CTA for additional allocations. Shipments to Southeast Asia have limited the availability of pyrotechnics in the theater.

14.(c) Ref par 2d(1): The 165th MI Company has the assigned mission of investigating reported subversion and dissaffection occurring in the 3d Armored Division area. Results of such investigations are furnished to affected commanders.

15.(c) Ref par 2e(1): Concur. An adequate power supply for the medical battalion is essential for mission accomplishment. Organic generators do not provide sufficient power for operation of field sterilizers, blood bank and surgical section with adequate backup power. Recommend AMEDD R & D review current power requirements of the medical battalion.

16.(c) Ref par 2e(2): TM9-1000-213-35 outlines test procedures to determine cause of this deficiency. Improper seating of the metal ball in the reservoir filter can be corrected by changing the hydraulic fluid and/or replacing the metal ball.

17.(f) Ref par 2e(3): Concur. Recommendation is IAW par 6 - 3, C1, AR 735-35.

18.(c) Ref par 2e(4): Concur. The problem as stated indicates a lack of properly supervised maintenance which the unit recognizes. If the problem persists with the wheel or brake system, TASCOM representatives will be notified, and a DA 2407 E.I.R. initiated.

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AETVCC-F (20 May 1970) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of The 3d Armored Division, WAEKFP, for The Period Ending 30 April 1970, RCS CSPOR-65 (RI)(S)

19(c) Ref par 2e(5): Unit has been advised to refer this problem to the appropriate assigned USATACOM Equipment Specialist for evaluation and recommendation.

20(c) Ref par 2g(1)1: Community leadership chain of command is responsible for insuring close rapport between US forces and German local officials.

21(c) Ref par 2g(1)2: Recommendation is valid only in so far as it may pertain to information that is not considered "significant" within the purview of par 7c, USAREUR Reg 360-10. The subject of CBR is considered significant and accordingly no release should be made without USAREUR approval.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Neil Haugland
N. HAUGLAND
ILT, AGC
Asst AG

Telephone: FKT MIL (2311) 6018

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE AND SEVENTH ARMY
APO NEW YORK 09403

AEACC-TU

8 JUL 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Reports, Lessons Learned (U)

Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development
Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) Operational Reports, Lessons Learned for 3d Armored Division,
8th Infantry Division, and 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment are hereby
forwarded.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "James L. Howell".

JAMES L. HOWELL
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

3 Incl
as
2 Incl wd, HQ, DA

A large, faint, handwritten mark or signature, possibly "COMINT", located at the bottom right of the page.

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